‘A new kind of power’: investigation reveals spread of Palantir’s influence across Europe

This summer, Palantir’s controversial CEO and co-founder Alex Karp told shareholders that Europe was lucky to have the services of his company, Palantir.

“We’re supporting lots of institutions in Europe … I mean clandestine institutions,” he said. “Without our products, they’d have rampant terrorism and their problems – their migration problems – and the results would be 10 times worse.”

Palantir does not disclose who its European clients are, what they purchase or to what extent they are dependent on those products. But research by journalists across the continent reveals that Palantir has offices in 14 European countries, including the UK, and does business with national governments – ministries, armed forces and national police forces – in at least 11 of them. The company also has an office in Israel and Palantir works closely with the Israeli army.

The figures cited cause concern among experts. They describe Europe’s reliance on Palantir for parts of its digital infrastructure as “dangerous”.

Palantir poses a threat, experts say, because of the company’s connection to the White House, and the anti-democratic ideology of Karp and his co-founder Peter Thiel. 

Since its foundation in 2003, Palantir has been intertwined with the US intelligence services and the Pentagon, but after Donald Trump’s return to the White House in 2025, the ties between the company and the US government became closer. 

Palantir secured billions of dollars’ worth of government contracts in the US for software used, among other things, to implement Trump’s Maga policy through the immigration agency ICE and the war in Iran. 

In Iran, the company has been linked to a bombing of a girls’ school in which more than 120 children were killed because the army’s targeting software was not up to date.

In public statements, Palantir and Karp make no secret of the fact that they want to make America the dominant power in the world. This year Karp said that, in the event of capacity issues, his company would always “prioritise US warfighters above everything else”.

Palantir’s tools are designed to link large amounts of data from various sources, make it searchable, and analyse and present it in such a way as to reveal connections that would otherwise have remained hidden. 

Palantir’s best-known tools are Gotham and Foundry. Foundry makes it easier to manage work processes in the commercial sector, while Gotham is specifically designed for law enforcement, defence and intelligence.

Another well-known product is the Maven Smart System. This serves as the US army’s central software platform and was also acquired by Nato in March 2025. 

Nato uses Maven as a central command system to ensure, among other things, that member states’ weapon systems communicate quickly and effectively during military operations. The system was awarded the highest security accreditation and runs on the part of Nato’s network that carries classified information.

Maven can process large amounts of data from satellites, drones, cameras, sensors, weather systems, telephone calls and countless other sources almost in real time to locate and take out targets. 

The system can carry out this process almost entirely autonomously. It identifies targets, devises a plan of attack, checks weapon stocks and – following human intervention in the form of a press of a button – neutralises opponents: “find, fix, finish”, in military jargon.

According to the CEO of Palantir UK, Louis Mosley, Nato utilises this capability. 

In eight of the 11 European countries where Palantir operates at national level, the ministry of defence and/or the armed forces are clients of the company. These include countries such as the UK, the Netherlands, Italy and Spain.

The UK is by far Palantir’s largest market outside the US. According to the Nerve, between 2012 and 2025 the company secured contracts worth nearly £1bn there with organisations including the Ministry of Defence, the National Health Service (NHS), the nuclear agency and the financial regulator. 

Security experts described the idea that the sensitive data involved in these deals would be secure as “woefully naive”.

Many of these European countries are also part of military alliances, such as Nato and the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF). 

Because Palantir’s software is deployed within these alliances, some countries automatically make use of it – even if they do not have direct contracts with Palantir. 

The Dutch ministry of defence uses both Gotham and Foundry to manage, execute and evaluate classified military operations carried out by the country’s special operations forces. Within the Nato framework, the Dutch ministry of defence deploys Maven to enable the interoperability of weapon systems during military missions.

Palantir’s software therefore processes highly sensitive information. In June, FTM revealed that, despite security measures, company employees had access to this classified data. 

The national police forces in at least five countries use Gotham: Finland, Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden and Demark. In Germany and the UK, the police use the software at federal or regional levels.

The Danish national police force uses Gotham under the name Pol-Intel and has even extended its use to Greenland, as discovered by the Danish newspaper Børsen. 

This Greenland roll-out came at precisely the moment that Trump was calling for the US to annex the autonomous territory. The call prompted the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS) to label the US as a threat. 

Earlier this month, the Danish news outlet Altinget reported that, due to the US threat and the close ties between Palantir and the White House, the Danish army had been instructed to halt the advanced talks on the purchase of Maven and to focus on a European alternative – despite the recent deal between the US, Greenland and Denmark. 

According to Intelligence Online, the Danish intelligence services were considering discontinuing the use of Palantir’s Gotham for the same reasons at the end of last year.

Intelligence services in Ukraine, France and the United Kingdom also use Palantir software.

Palantir’s European operations are not limited to the law enforcement and security sectors. 

In Lithuania, the state data agency has in recent years signed contracts with the company with a value that could go over €67m.

Through this contract, the software is used by Lithuanian customs, among other bodies of government. In Norway, customs are so pleased with Palantir that the existing contract, which was due to expire in 2025, has been extended until 2030.

In Ukraine, alongside the army and the military security service, the ministry of digital transformation and the public prosecutor’s office also use Palantir’s software. 

The Polish family, labour and social policy, and home affairs ministries engaged the company from 2022 to 2025, among other things to record the movements and whereabouts of Ukrainian refugees – including minors – who had fled to Poland.

Previously, a Palantir spokesperson confirmed to FTM that the company’s software had been used to support the resettlement of Ukrainian refugees in various European countries.

Our survey found, meanwhile, that contact between Palantir and European governments occurred with striking frequency in the aftermath of a disaster. 

In France, for example, the company gained a foothold following the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, and its collaboration with the UK’s NHS and the Lithuanian state data agency came about around the start of the coronavirus pandemic.

Despite Karp’s claim that, without Palantir’s products, countries would have “rampant terrorism”, many nations have declined the services of the US company.

Palantir’s attempts to sell its software to the Austrian ministry of defence came to nothing – despite a pilot project in 2018 – the Austrian outlet Der Standard reported. Nor did the country’s ministry of the interior make a deal, despite repeated attempts.

The same applied to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), the notorious Israeli intelligence unit Unit 8200, and the Shin Bet security service. According to the Israeli newspaper Globes, despite Palantir’s close ties with the IDF, the services decided after a trial not to enter into a partnership with the company.

The Swiss army repeatedly rejected the company’s advances, as revealed by the Swiss investigative platform Republik in late 2025 on the basis of internal documents. There were not only ethical objections – the risks of dependency and the leakage of government data to the US government were also deemed too great.

In Germany, the head of the Bundeswehr’s Cyber and Information Space Command told Handelsblatt in April that the country’s army should not do business with the company at all. This was to prevent Palantir employees from gaining access to sensitive defence data.

Despite its recently opened office in Brussels, Palantir has not received a warm welcome from the Belgian government either. In June, the Belgian ministers of defence and foreign affairs told parliament they do not do business with Palantir and have no plans to do so.

The country’s federal police had already taken a similar stance.

The Belgian ministers did not give a formal reason, but it can be inferred from their written statements to parliament, seen by FTM, that the importance of European digital sovereignty carries significant weight. 

A desire for digital autonomy is prompting some governments to review their ties with Palantir.

In June, the French prime minister, Sébastien Lecornu, announced that his domestic intelligence service would not renew the contract – which had been extended as recently as December 2025 – a further time. This was to avoid strategic dependence. 

The Norwegian national police also decided not to renew its contract, which is due to expire in 2027. However, according to the Morgenbladet newspaper, this was because use of the software failed to get off the ground due to local privacy laws that prevented the integration of the necessary databases. 

In the UK, several police forces have recently distanced themselves from Palantir, and the possibility of terminating the NHS’s mega-contract is being investigated. 

In early October, the new prime minister, Andy Burnham, announced that he intended to replace Palantir with a home-grown alternative. A UK parliamentary committee described the growing reliance on the company as an “unacceptable point of weakness” and stated that Palantir represented a “clear mismatch” with the country’s values. 

The committee also noted that, following Palantir’s public endorsement of CEO Karp’s controversial political views, the US company can no longer be regarded as apolitical.

In September, a group of more than 120 European NGOs, trade unions and European institutions from 30 countries called on governments in an open letter to sever ties with the company. In doing so, they referred, among other things, to the issues of dependency and the allegations of human rights violations. 

Nevertheless, there appears to be no sign of a radical transformation as yet. 

The Polish ministry of defence signed a letter of intent with Palantir in 2025 for the development of artificial intelligence, and the Lithuanian ministry of defence signed a memorandum of understanding with the company in 2023 for a central data management platform.

Furthermore, around the time of the UN General Assembly in New York in September, the presidents of Poland and Lithuania also spoke with Karp about the possibility of turning their countries into a hub for the development of military technology and the protection of Nato’s eastern flank.

Elke Schwarz, a professor of political theory at Queen Mary, University of London, researches the development of military AI and autonomous weapons. 

According to her, European countries’ dependence on Palantir is problematic, particularly because of its close ties to the White House “Certainly when it comes to national security, dependence on a company that openly states that another state – in this case the US – has undisputed priority [is a problem].” 

As more government bodies in a country do business with such a company, these problems grow, Schwarz said. “The temptation is there, because the promise is that their systems work better if you link more data streams together, but the downside is that you make yourself increasingly dependent and therefore more vulnerable.”

Schwarz added: “We know that Palantir develops close ties with government officials wherever it goes.” She pointed to the large number of civil servants the company recruited in the US and the UK, after which it managed to secure contracts with their former employers. “The question then is, is Palantir able to influence decision-making this way, and if so, how far does its influence extend?”

According to Francesca Bria, this is part of a deliberate strategy. Bria is a professor at University College London and leader of the EuroStack initiative for European digital sovereignty. “By hiring former civil servants and embedding engineers within government agencies, Palantir gains control over governments’ core systems,” she said. “This creates a dependency that is almost impossible to undo.”

Bria also criticised the secrecy surrounding governments’ contracts with Palantir. 

“When it comes to national security, you can’t disclose everything,” she said. “But if you’re managing a country’s critical infrastructure, you have a duty to make it clear who controls the data flowing through it, who bears ultimate responsibility, and who can shut down the system. Governments have a responsibility to their citizens, not to American oligarchs.”

According to her, the reliance on Palantir in critical infrastructure touches on a fundamental issue in particular: “A company so deeply intertwined with the US government and its mission of American supremacy is a critical component of the infrastructure of a new kind of power – one built on technology and dependence. Europe has entrusted its most sensitive systems to a company that will never put Europe's interests first.”

Bria added: “It’s dangerous that their software, of all things, is embedded deep within the fabric of our society and processes the data of millions of Europeans, while the software itself – because it’s a commercial enterprise – is not transparent. Not even to European governments. This makes democratic oversight impossible. That’s not how critical public systems are supposed to work.” 

It doesn’t have to be that way, she concluded. “The countries that don’t work with Palantir and are re-evaluating their position prove that Europe can do without it. Countries that do buy into it aren’t just purchasing software – they’re giving up their sovereignty.”

FTM presented the results of this investigation to Palantir and asked detailed follow-up questions on its findings. A spokesperson for the company did not address those questions but said in a statement: 

“There is a serious debate to be had about how Europe safeguards its sovereignty as technology plays an ever-greater role in our security, economies, and daily lives. But that debate should be grounded in facts.

“Technological sovereignty should ultimately be measured by who controls the data, the decisions, and the mission – not simply by the nationality of the software provider.

“Since 2011, Palantir has worked with Europe’s democratically elected governments and institutions to increase hospital capacity, speed up cancer diagnosis, safely resettle refugees, tackle organised crime, protect victims of domestic violence, and respond faster to floods and other emergencies.”

In an earlier response to FTM, Palantir denied the allegations of involvement in human rights violations.

Additional reporting by Rosanne Kropman and Elias Rutten. This piece was first published on Follow the Money, 15 October 2026.